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The Case for Returning Politicians to the
Supreme Court
ROBERT ALLEMAN* AND JASON MAZZONE**
In the past few decades, prior service in the federal judiciary has become an
increasingly important qualification for appointment to the Supreme Court. As a result,
the Court has lost one kind of Justice who was very nearly a constant on the Court for
170 years: the politician who joins the Court after distinguished and prominent service
in public life. Politicians of national prominence should be returned to the Supreme
Court. These statesmen give legitimacy to the Court in an age when confirmation
hearings are unrevealing. They have a history of accountability on concrete legal and
political issues. They bring wisdom and skills that can improve the work of the Court.
Today's Supreme Court interprets and reviews statutes and decides issues of executive
power without any Justice with experience voting on legislation or serving as a cabinet
member. Former politicians can enhance the Court's interactions with the other
branches of government and predict and manage the political fallout from unpopular
decisions.
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The resignation of Mr. Johnson, one of the Associate Judges, having
occasioned a vacancy on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United
States, it is incumbent upon me to bring forward a suitable Character
to fill that place. In performing this part of my duty, I think it necessary
to select a person who is not only professionally qualified to discharge
that important trust, but one who is known to the public and whose
conduct meets their approbation.
Under this impression, Sir, I have turned my thoughts upon you; and
if you will permit me to nominate you for this Office, I shall have the
satisfaction to bel[ie]ve that our Country will be pleased with, and
benefitted by the acquisition.
- George Washington, Letter to William Paterson (1793)'
The Federal judges must not only be good citizens, and men
possessed of that information and integrity which are indispensable to
magistrates, but they must be statesmen-politicians, not unread in the
signs of the times, not afraid to brave the obstacles which can be
subdued, nor slow to turn aside such encroaching elements as may
threaten the supremacy of the Union and the obedience which is due
to the laws.
-Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835)2
INTRODUCTION
On February i, 2006, with the arrival of Samuel Alito to replace
Sandra Day O'Connor, the Supreme Court of the United States became
staffed entirely with former federal circuit judges. This was the first time
in the Court's history that all of the Justices had previously served on a
i. Letter from George Washington to William Paterson, (Feb. 20, 1793), in I THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-i8oo, at 88, 88 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985) (internal footnotes
omitted).
2. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 172 (Henry Reeve trans.. Bantam 2000)
(1835).
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circuit court? O'Connor's departure also left the Court without a single
member who had ever been elected to public office.4 With Sonia
Sotomayor, who served for seventeen years on the circuit and district
courts in New York (and whose only other government service was five
years as a prosecutor),5 the Court today also consists entirely of former
circuit judges, none of whom has held elected office.
These developments represent the culmination of a trend. In the
past few decades, prior service in the federal judiciary has become an
increasingly important qualification for appointment to the Supreme
Court. Since the early nineteenth century, there have been members of
the Court who were previously federal judges. However, until very
recently, lower court judges who were appointed to the Court had also
typically served in other public positions that were of greater prominence
than the prior judgeship. Increasingly, service as a federal judge has
become the most significant position Supreme Court nominees have
held. The job of Supreme Court Justice has become a professional
occupation, requiring prior judicial experience-and the more the better.
The Court has, in other words, become a bureaucracy.
At the press conference in which he introduced Sotomayor as his
nominee, President Barack Obama announced that "[w]alking in the
door she would bring more experience on the bench, and more varied
experience on the bench, than anyone currently serving on the United
States Supreme Court had when they were appointed."6 Soon thereafter,
the White House put out the message that "[i]f confirmed, Sotomayor
would bring more federal judicial experience to the Supreme Court than
any Justice in oo years...." 7 President George H.W. Bush viewed
service on the circuit court as so essential to marketing his two nominees,
Clarence Thomas and David Souter, that he first nominated them to the
circuit courts (the D.C. Circuit and the First Circuit, respectively), where
they served for very short periods prior to elevation.8 Promising
3. See infra Table A. Table A sets out previous judicial service and notable public offices held by
each of the Justices.
4. See infra Table A.
5. See Supreme Court of the United States, Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme
Court, Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last
visited June 24, 2010).
6. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor
to the United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office!
Remarks-by-the-President-in-Nominating-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-
Court/.
7. Posting of Jesse Lee to The White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2oo9/o5/26/
presidentrsquos-nominee-judge-sonia-sotomayor#main-content (May 26, 2009, 12:15 ETD).
8. Justice Thomas was confirmed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on March 6,
1990 and joined the Supreme Court on October 23, 1991. See Supreme Court of the United States,
Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/aboutfbiographies.aspx (last visited June 24, 2olo). Justice Souter was
1355
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
candidates without prior federal service are, in this manner, laundered
through the circuit courts. On occasion, the importance of service on a
circuit court has also produced confirmation battles over circuit court
nominees when senators have perceived that the President is positioning
the nominee for promotion. Miguel Estrada, Janice Rogers Brown,
Priscilla Owen, and Sonia Sotomayor all faced opposition on this basis.9
As the Supreme Court has become filled with former judges, it has
lost one kind of Justice who was very nearly a constant on the Court for
170 years: the politician who joins the Court after distinguished and
prominent service in public life. The last Justice of this kind to be
appointed was Earl Warren. 0
Politicians of national prominence, we argue, should be on the
Supreme Court. These statesmen give legitimacy to the Court in an age
when confirmation hearings are unrevealing. They bring a clear record of
positions on political issues that may better inform the public of the
direction they may take as Justices charged with determining the
meaning of our Constitution. They also bring wisdom and skills that
vastly improve the work of the Court. There are numerous examples of
the impact of statesmen upon the Court. John McLean, author of the
powerful dissent in Dred Scott," was Postmaster General. 2 William
Howard Taft, the twenty-seventh President and later tenth Chief Justice,
created the Judicial Conference, 3 secured passage of the 1925 Judiciary
Act,14 and persuaded Congress to give the Court the magnificent building
16in which it now sits." Robert Jackson, dissenter in Korematsu and
author of the framework for assessing presidential claims of authority in
confirmed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on May 25, 1990 and joined the Supreme
Court on October 9, 1990. See Supreme Court of the United States, Biographies of Current Justices of
the Supreme Court, David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Retired), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx (last visited June 24, 2010).
9. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The A-List, 43 NAT'L J. 3211, 3214 (2004) ("[President] Bush nominated
[Miguel] Estrada in 2001 for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, but Democrats-fearing
that Bush might be grooming him for the Supreme Court-stopped his nomination...."); Joan
Biskupic, Bush s Conservatism to Live Long in the U S. Courts: Lifetime Appointments to the Bench
Carve Out President's Judicial Legacy, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 2oo8, at 4A (discussing opposition to the
nominations of Priscilla Owens and Janice Rogers Brown); Neil A. Lewis, After Delay, Senate
Approves Judge for Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3. 1998, at B2 ("[Republican] lawmakers said
they believed President Clinton was eager to place a Hispanic person, like Judge Sotomayor, on the
Supreme Court, and they held up consideration of her [circuit court] nomination for months.
xo. See infra Table A.
ii. Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i9 How.) 393, 529-64 (1857) (McLean, J., dissenting).
12. See infra Table A.
13. Francis Graham Lee, Commentary to 8 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: "LIBERTY UNDER LAW" AND SELECTED SUPREME COURT OPINIONS, at xvii, xviii
(David H. Burton & Francis Graham Lee eds., 2004).
14. Id.
15. Id. at xviii-xix.
i6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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emergencies," was Attorney General and Solicitor General. 8 Former
Senator Hugo Black was the Court's most able student of the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights." Earl Warren, former Governor of
California, was the reason the Court spoke unanimously in Brown.20
Justices like these would contribute much to a Supreme Court that,
today, plays an important policymaking role and whose Chief has vast
administrative responsibilities. 2' Observing that when he joined the Court
there were three Justices with no prior judicial experience and now there
are none, Justice Scalia has argued that "it's good for the [C]ourt to have
people of varying [professional] backgrounds."22 We agree. With
17. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
6 34-55 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
18. See infra Table A.
19. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN
AND THE NATION HE MADE 326 (2oo6) ("Brown v. Board of Education had many contributors, but in
the end it was Warren's feat. Its unanimity was his singular accomplishment.").
21. See generally Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the
Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (2oo6)
(discussing the powers of the Chief Justice).
22. Scalia: Supreme Court Needs Justices with Varied Job Experience, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 4,
2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20io/oi/o4/scalia-says-varied-job-ex-n-4I1io87.html.
23. Scalia was not the first to observe that the Court lacks Justices without prior judicial
experience, and while we offer a unique approach, we are not the first to call for politicians. See, e.g.,
DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICEs: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME
COURT NOMINEES 170 (1999) ("[F]ederal circuit court judges have become the 'darlings' of the
selection process . . . ."); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial
Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903,
906 (2003) ("Largely as a result of th[e] norm of prior judicial experience, today's Court, while
growing more diverse in some dimensions, is becoming less so on the dimension of career diversity."
(footnote omitted)); Herbert A. Johnson, Comments in Reply, 56 S.C. L. REV. 451, 455 (2005) ("All of
our greatest chief justices-Marshall, Taft, Hughes, and Warren-carried political experience onto the
Supreme Court bench. A background of governmental experience and political wisdom would seem to
be an essential ingredient for preeminence in this office." (footnote omitted)); Timothy P. O'Neill,
"The Stepford Justices": The Need for Experiential Diversity on the Roberts Court, 6o OKRLA. L. REV.
701, 735 (2007) ("[W]e need to return to a tradition ... that saw ... justices coming to the Court with
rich backgrounds in the legislative and executive, as well as the judicial, branch. We need some justices
with the 'people skills' of politicians, as well as some justices coming straight from the legal academy.
We need some justices with 'street smarts' as much as we need some justices who are intellectuals.");
Norman J. Ornstein, Clinton Should Look to Another Member for Court Opening, ROLL CALL, Apr.
25, 1994, at 5 ("Nothing could do more to foster appropriate relations and harmony among the
branches, and to create a better process of judicial decision-making, than to fill the Court's vacancy
with a savvy and experienced Member of Congress."); D.W. Miller, Verbatim, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Sept. 24, 1999, at A28 ("If they're [the Justices] going to settle politically charged cases, it seems to me
the relevant expertise is politics. If you go back to the Supreme Court of the '40s and '50s, Justices had
substantial experience: Earl Warren[,] Hugo Black[,] Felix Frankfurter[,] Robert Jackson. Today we
have these kind-of virgins-nine Justices whose cumulative political experience is slight." (quoting
Judge Richard Posner) (internal quotations omitted)); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF
STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 13 (1999) ("An important
lesson [of the Supreme Court's decisions upholding the independent counsel law and allowing Paula
Jones's suit against President Clinton to proceed before he left office] is the inability of a Supreme
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President Barack Obama likely to have additional opportunities to name
Supreme Court Justices, he should look beyond the circuit courts and
restore the politician's place on the Court.
Parts I and II trace the ways in which the modern Supreme Court
has become bureaucratized. Part I traces the recent increase in Supreme
Court appointees from the circuit courts and sets forth the features of
bureaucratic organization that characterize the modern judiciary. Part II
traces the corresponding disappearance of politicians from the Court.
Part III sets out the costs that this bureaucratization entails. Part IV
examines the benefits of having distinguished politicians on the Court
and argues in favor of returning politicians to the Court today. We
conclude by suggesting how the President could go about selecting
politicians for the Court.
I. THE RISE OF THE BUREAUCRATIC COURT
The Constitution does not require that Supreme Court Justices be
lawyers,24 and no federal statute has ever required legal training for
membership on the Court. Nonetheless, all iii Justices have been
lawyers." However, only recently has prior service as a federal judge
been viewed as a desirable qualification for service on the Supreme
Court. Thirty-three Supreme Court Justices have previously served on a
lower federal court." Of these, sixteen Justices were appointed in the
second half of the twentieth century, and eleven have been appointed
since 1970. The first Justice to have previously served on the federal
bench was Robert Trimble, who, when appointed in 1826, had served for
Court none of whose members has substantial political experience to deal adequately with cases that
have a heavy political charge."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, iii
HARV. L. Rev. 54, 149 (1997) ("[T]he current Justices seem less well equipped to play a representative
role than many of their predecessors.... [T]here may be a consequent loss in the Court's capacity to
gauge the resonance of its judgments with relevant public moral understandings.").
24. See generally U.S. CONsT. art. III; see also WILLIAM D. BADER & Roy M. MERSKY, THE FIRST
ONE HUNDRED EIGHT JUSTICES 7 (2004) ("[N]either the Constitution nor acts of Congress have ever
required a legal background for membership on the Supreme Court . . . ."); Adrian Vermeule, Should
We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (2007) ("By 'lay Justices' I mean Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States who are not accredited lawyers. Currently the number of lay
Justices is zero, although there is no constitutional or statutory rule that requires this.").
25. See Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1574 ("In the United States, no nonlawyer has ever served on
the federal Supreme Court in the modern era. The qualifier 'in the modern era' refers to the era of
accredited law schools and legal requirements that students attend such a school, requirements that
became universal around 1950. Even before the modem rules took hold, however, every person
nominated to the Supreme Court had received substantial legal training, perhaps by way of
apprenticeship or study towards a bar exam. In that sense, we can drop the qualifier and just say that
no nonlawyer has ever served on the Court." (footnotes omitted)).
26. See infra Table A.
27. See infra Table A.
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nine years on the district court in Kentucky. 8 Of the fifty-eight Justices
confirmed before the end of the nineteenth century-from James Wilson
to Joseph McKenna-just nine Justices, slightly more than fifteen
percent, previously served as a federal judge." By contrast, of the
seventeen Justices confirmed since 1965-the period running from the
appointment of Abe Fortas to the appointment of Sonia Sotomayor-
thirteen Justices (or seventy-six percent) came from a circuit court, and
five of those came from the D.C. Circuit. 0 Of the forty-one members of
the Court with no prior judicial experience at all, thirty-one were
appointed before 1940.3'
Yet even these numbers do not tell the whole story. It is not just that
recent Justices are more likely to have come from the circuit courts: They
also are less likely to have served in any other significant governmental
position. While several members of the current Supreme Court have
served in government, only two have held prominent political posts:
Samuel Alito, who was the United States Attorney for New Jersey, 32 and
Clarence Thomas, who headed the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.33 This is a stark departure from the credentials of earlier
nominees who served on the lower courts. For example, Peter Daniel,
the twenty-eighth Justice, was a federal district court judge, but also a
former Virginia legislator and Lieutenant Governor of Virginia. 34
William Day, the fifty-ninth Justice, was both a judge on the Sixth Circuit
and the U.S. Secretary of State." Sherman Minton, the eighty-seventh
Justice, served as a circuit court judge and a fiercely partisan U.S.
Senator. The last sitting Senator to join the Court was Harold Burton,
appointed by Harry Truman in J945.37 It was also once not uncommon to
give up a position on a lower federal court to serve in political office
before being named to the Supreme Court. Joseph McKenna resigned
from the Ninth Circuit after five years to serve in the McKinley
28. See id; see also Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Robert
Trimble, http://www.fjc.gov/serylet/nGetinfo?jid-2413&cid=999&ctype-na&instate=na (last visited
June 24, 2010).
29. See infra Table A.
30. See infra Table A.
31. See infra Table A.
32. See infra Table A; see also Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges:
Samuel A. Aito Jr., http://www.fjc.gov/serylet/nGetInfo?jid=26&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last
visited June 24, 2010).
33. See infra Table A; see also Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges:
Clarence Thomas, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2362&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last
visited June 24, 2olo).
34. See infra Table A; see also Te SUPREME COURT JUStiCES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-
1993, at 137-38 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993)
35. See infra Table A; see aso THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 293.
36. See infra Table A; see also THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICEs, supra note 34, at 432-33.
37. See infra Table A; see also THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICEs, supra note 34, at 418.
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administration. 8 Fred Vinson, named to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit in 1937, gave up his judgeship in 1943 to serve in the
Roosevelt Administration as Director of the Office of Economic
Stabilization, Administrator of the Federal Loan Agency, and Director
of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion; at the time he was
named to the Court, Vinson was serving as Truman's Secretary of the
Treasury. 39 The last Supreme Court Justice who left a lower federal court
to serve in the government was Thurgood Marshall, who resigned from
the Second Circuit to become Solicitor General.40
The anomaly of the composition of today's Court is even more
apparent when it comes to the position of Chief Justice. Before William
Howard Taft, who was a judge on the Sixth Circuit for eight years,
became the tenth Chief Justice in 1921, no Chief Justice had ever been a
judge on a lower federal court.4' Taft, of course, was no mere circuit court
judge. He was Solicitor General before he became a circuit court judge
and left his judgeship to become Governor of the Philippines, Secretary
of War, and then President of the United States." Aside from Taft, only
three of the nation's seventeen Chief Justices had been lower federal
judges before their nomination, all recent: Fred M. Vinson (thirteenth),
Warren E. Burger (fifteenth) and now John G. Roberts (seventeenth).43
Historically, instead of service on a lower court, almost all of the Chief
Justices had distinguished political careers: as Attorney General (Stone,"
Taney45 ), Secretary of the Treasury (Taney,46 Chase47), Secretary of State
(Marshall4 8), Congressman (Marshall49), Senator (Ellsworth,"o Chase,"
38. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 283-84.
39. See id. at 423-24.
40. See id. at 479.
41. See generally infra Table A. Nine Chief Justices preceded Taft: Jay, Rutledge, Ellsworth,
Marshall, Taney, Chase, Waite, Fuller, and White. BADER & MERSKY, supra note 24, at 76-78. None of
them served as either a federal circuit judge or trial judge. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note
34, at 1-3, 6-9, 11-14, 46-49, 62, I6-18, 191-94, 211-12, 246-49. Nine of the seventeen Chief Justices
had their first judicial experience on the Supreme Court. See BADER & MERSKY, supra note 24, at 8.
42. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 342-43.
43. Seven Chief Justices have succeeded Taft: Hughes, Stone. Vinson, Warren, Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts. Roberts served on the D.C. Circuit. See infra Table A. Warren had no prior
judicial experience. See infra Table A. Vinson served on the D.C. Circuit and the Emergency Court of
Appeals. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 423. Burger served on the D.C. Circuit as
well. Id. at 482. Hughes had already served on the Supreme Court, and Rehnquist and Stone were
elevated from associate's seats, though none of these three had served in a judicial position prior to
joining the Supreme Court. See id. at 306,365, 500.
44. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 362.
45. Id. at 117.
46. Id. at ii8.
47. Id. at 193.
48. Id. at 63.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 48.
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White"), Governor (Chase,53 Hughes,54 Rutledge," Warren'6), or in other
prominent positions."
The emergence of a circuit court judgeship as a virtual prerequisite
for service on the Supreme Court parallels the general evolution in the
legal profession towards more rigid qualifications. As the profession
itself has become more specialized, the notion of the lawyer- or even
judge-as a generalist has faded as well.'" Indeed, although every Justice
has been a lawyer, it was not until the appointment of Charles Whittaker
in 1957 that all nine members of the Supreme Court were law school
graduates.59 Until the late nineteenth century, most people entered the
legal profession by reading law under the supervision of an experienced
lawyer.to Holmes was the first Justice to have a "modern" law degree (a
Harvard LL.B., Class of 1866),61 but not all Justices since the advent of
the modern law school have had a degree.62 Robert H. Jackson, born in
1892, was the last Justice to serve without a law degree, though he
completed a two-year course at Albany Law School in a year.6 The trend
of selection of Supreme Court Justices from the circuit courts thus
appears consistent with the profession's trend on the whole toward
increased standardization and specialized training.
The emergence of a "professional Justice" is also demonstrated by
the fact that for the modern Supreme Court Justice, there are no jobs
after the Supreme Court. Earlier Justices did not necessarily view
appointment to the Court as the final line on their resumes: John Jay
resigned as Chief Justice in 1795 to become Governor of New York and
served two three-year terms in that position.64 William Cushing, the
longest serving of Washington's six original Justices, ran while on the
Court against Samuel Adams in the 1794 Massachusetts gubernatorial
51. Id. at 192.
52. Id. at 272.
53. Id. at 192.
54. Id. at 308.
55. Id. at 7-8. Rutledge was elected "President" of the Republic of South Carolina in 1776; the
position was renamed "Governor" under the 1778 Constitution. Id.
56. Id. at 437.
57. See infra Table A.
58. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REv. 519, 525 (2008)
("The . . . legal profession[], which for years grappled with specialization, [is] today remarkably
specialized, particularly at the most elite levels of practice.").
59. See BADER & MERSKY, supra note 24, at ro.
6o. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 240-44 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1998) (1984).
6i. See BADER & MERSKY, supra note 24, at lo.
62. See TnE SUPREME COURT JUsTICEs, supra note 34, at 406-0.
63. Justice Jackson read onto the New York bar i 9i3. Id. at 406.
64. Id. at 4.
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election.65 Smith Thompson, former Secretary of the Navy, ran for
governor of New York as a sitting Justice in 1828.66 John McLean, whose
career as Associate Justice pre-dated the Taney period and almost saw
the end of the same, was Postmaster General (a powerful and significant
political appointment at the time) under Monroe, Adams, and Jackson.
After Jackson named McLean to the Court in 1829, he was presidential
candidate four times and for four political parties during his thirty-two-
year tenure on the bench-first as an Anti-Mason, then as an
Independent, then as a Whig and a Free-Soiler, in 1842, and finally as a
Republican in 1856.68 Salmon Chase angled for the Democratic
presidential nomination in 1868.69 David Davis resigned from the
Supreme Court in 1877 to represent Illinois in the U.S. Senate. 0 Charles
Evans Hughes, who was serving as Governor of New York at the time of
his appointment to the Court, resigned his post to accept the Republican
nomination for President in i9I6." (President Herbert Hoover
reappointed Hughes in 1930, this time as Chief Justice.)72 Prominent New
Deal Senator James Byrnes resigned from the Court after fifteen months
to become Director of the Office of Economic Mobilization in 1942;,7 he
would soon oversee the domestic war effort as head of the Office of War
Mobilization and later become Secretary of State and Governor of South
Carolina. 74
To a striking degree, today's judiciary has the features that Max
Weber identified as characteristic of bureaucratic organization.
According to Weber, the following features distinguish bureaucratic
organizations from traditional administrative forms: (i) jurisdictional
areas are clearly specified with rules defining the regular activities of
65. See Tom W. CAMPBELL, FOUR SCORE FORGOTTEN MEN: SKETCHES OF THE JUSTICES OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 42 (1950).
66. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUiT OF JUSTICE 522 (Christopher Tomlins ed.,
2005).
67. HENRY J. ABRAH/AM, JUSTICEs, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON To BUSH 11 78 (2oo8). McLean's own work furthered the power and
prestige of his office; he "proved to be an exceptionally able administrator, popular with his
employees. He greatly expanded the number of routes and deliveries, [and] established more than
3,ooo new post offices .... He converted an operational loss of more than $ 15o,ooo a year ... to a net
profit of $ioo,ooo by 1827. The service became the largest department of government, employing
almost 27,000 people by 1828." THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 1o3.
68. ABRAHAM, supra note 67, at 79.
69. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 194.
70. Id. at 185.
71. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES XVii, XiX
(David Joseph Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973); see also THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra
note 34, at 308.
72. IRVING STONE, THEY ALSO RAN: THE STORY OF THE MEN WHO WERE DEFEATED FOR THE
PRESIDENCY 137 (1943).
73. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, Supra Ilote 34, at 404-05.
74. Id. at 405.
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personnel as official duties; (2) the organization is arranged
hierarchically with supervision of subordinates by superiors, but the
scope of superiors' authority is circumscribed; (3) a system of abstract
rules governs official actions, these rules are stable and can be learned,
and official decisions are recorded in permanent files; (4) the means for
carrying out administrative functions (such as equipment and privileges)
belong to the office not the officeholder, and personal property is
demarcated from official property; (5) officials are selected on the basis
of technical qualifications, appointed rather than elected, and
compensated by salary; (6) employment in the organization is a lifetime
career, with the employee (after a trial period) gaining a tenured position
with salary protection, protection from arbitrary dismissal, and a pension
upon retirement.75
The first four of these features clearly apply to the modern judiciary
and require only brief mention. The courts operate under a fixed
jurisdiction. Within the judicial branch, functions are defined and
distributed among professionals who are arranged hierarchically:
appellate judges, trial judges, magistrates, clerks, administrative
assistants, courtroom deputies, stenographers, and marshals. The courts
are rule-bound and decisions are recorded and often published. There
are clear divisions between the property that belongs to the court and is
used for official business and that which is personal property.
More significant for our purposes are the characteristics of the
individuals who staff the courts and, in particular, the path those
individuals take to the Supreme Court. With the Court staffed by former
lower court judges, it conforms closely to the Weberian model: Lower
court judges advance through the ranks on the basis of technical
competence, and judicial service comes to an end only with death or
retirement. Earlier courts were quite different. In the past, because many
seats were filled by politicians, lower court judges could not reasonably
have expected to be on a career path to the Supreme Court. Chief Justice
Rehnquist recalled advice he received from Justice Frankfurter during
his clerkship with Justice Jackson in the 1952 Term: "I remember Felix
Frankfurter talking to a group of us law clerks and saying that the one
thing you absolutely should never do was to try to plan to be a member
of [the Supreme] Court, because there was no way you could go about
it.", Such advice is less sound today. With the path to the Supreme Court
75. See 2 MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956-oo5 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich trans.,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 1978) (1924).
76. C-SPAN Booknotes Interview: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests (CSPAN
television broadcast June 23, 1992), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/progranm/26896-s. By contrast, Justice
Alito's Princeton yearbook entry read: "Sam intends to go to law school and eventually to warm a seat




narrowed to proficient service on a lower federal court (and in particular
a circuit court), that path shows the aspiring Supreme Court Justice the
way to go about achieving the goal. To be sure, as in any bureaucracy,
there is no certainty of reaching the highest office -there are many more
circuit judges than Supreme Court vacancies-but the surest path to the
Court is through the circuit courts.
II. THE MISSING POLITICIANS
Missing from today's Court is the statesman who takes the bench
after a distinguished period of service in public life. Of all the
government offices the Constitution created, federal judgeships are the
only ones whose holders are entitled to serve for life-an honor reserved
in the Old World for kings and noblemen. It is, therefore, unsurprising
that earlier Presidents, in selecting Supreme Court Justices, looked to
distinguished statesmen.
In making his appointments, George Washington evidently believed
the position of Supreme Court Justice to be an honorary position-a
reward for capable and prestigious service in government.8 Although at
its inception the Supreme Court lacked the prestige it has today and
service involved the arduous task of riding circuit, "all twelve of
Washington's Supreme Court appointments came from the political
party of the Federalists," and all were prominent members thereof.79
John Jay was President of the Continental Congress in the late 1770s
(and had filled other important political posts) before joining the Court
as its first Chief Justice." John Rutledge was the famously dictatorial
war-time "President" and later Governor of South Carolina, having been
a delegate to the Second Continental Congress and a signatory of the
Declaration of Independence. 8' William Paterson, a former Governor of
New Jersey, signed the Constitution as a representative from the third
77. See generally REBECCA FRASER, THE STORY OF BRITAIN: FROM THE ROMANS TO THE PRESENT: A
NARRATIVE HISTORY (Ist Am. ed. 2oo5).
78. See Letter from George Washington to Robert H. Harrison (Sept. 28, 1789), in I THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-18oo, at 35 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1985). In
naming Harrison to the Supreme Court, Washington wrote:
[I]t has been the invariable object of my anxious solicitude to select the fittest
characters to expound the Laws and dispense Justice. To tell you that this sentiment
has ruled me in your nomination to a seat on the Supreme Bench of the United States,
would be but to repeat opinions with which you are already well acquainted, opinions
which meet a just co-incidence in the public mind.
Id.
79. See MICHAEL 3. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTIrUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 51 (2000).
8O. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 1-4.
8SI. Id. at 7-8.
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State." Thomas Johnson was the first Governor of Maryland and a
Convention Delegate.' James Wilson was a member of the Committee
of Detail responsible for drafting the Constitution.84 Although service on
today's Court is generally considered to be more powerful and
prestigious and in many ways easier than in times past-today, for
example, the Justices no longer ride circuit, and they control their
docket-the honorary dimension is all but lost. Instead, a seat on the
Supreme Court is now the beginning of a distinguished and prominent
career in national service, rather than a reward for such service already
performed."
While no other President would replicate Washington's slate of
statesmen-Justices, prominent politicians were members of the Court for
most of our history. When William Moody joined the Court in 1906, he
had served four terms in the House of Representatives, two years as
Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy, and two more as
Roosevelt's Attorney General." Congressman Moody was an outspoken
progressive who championed civil service reform, voting rights, labor
reform for government workers, and the direct election of U.S. Senators;
he vigorously fought the disenfranchisement of Blacks in the South." As
Attorney General, Moody carried Roosevelt's trust-busting campaign to
82. Id. at 37, 39.
83. Id. at 33-34.
84. Id. at 17. Upon Wilson's nomination to be Chief Justice, the editors of the Federal Gazette
wrote approvingly:
This worthy citizen devoted himself to the cause of American freedom in 1774, and has
shared in every toil and danger of the revolution. His hand, his heart, his tongue and his
pen, have ever been at the command of his country. To his laborious investigations into the
principles and forms of every species of government that has ever existed in the world[] and
to his powerful reasonings in the late federal convention, the United States are indebted for
many of the perfections of the new constitution.
The office allotted for that distinguished patriot and legislator by his grateful
countrymen, will require an uncommon share of legal and political abilities and information.
A new system of federal jurisprudence must be formed; a new region in the administration
of justice must be explored, in which genius alone can supply the defect of precedent; and
who so equal to those great and original undertakings as that favorite son of Pennsylvania,
James Wilson, esq.
FED. GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 1789, reprinted in I THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1860, at 609, 6o9 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1985).
85. An analogy to the earlier composition of the Court lies in a feature of the current British
system of government. Distinguished British politicians are elevated to noble status in the twilight of
their careers. For example, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is a baroness in the House of
Lords, the legislative body where, until 2oo9, the British constitutional court of last resort sat for
centuries. See BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS 358 (Robert Eccleshall &
Graham S. Walker eds., 1998). For the formal judicial functions of the House of Lords, see Appellate
Jurisdiction Act, 39 & 40 Vict. cx59 (1876) (Eng.), which was superseded by the Constitutional Reform
Act, 2005, c.4 (Eng.), available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/documents2Oo5/4/ukpga/c4/part3




its zenith, pioneered the use of the criminal provisions of the Sherman
Act to supplement civil enforcement actions, and obtained convictions
against Standard Oil and other monopolies.? On the Court, Moody
combined a strong nationalism in economic matters with deference to
state judicial processes. 0
George Sutherland, the seventieth Justice, served in state office,
then for two terms in the United States Senate and later as President of
the American Bar Association.9 ' Senator Sutherland played an important
role in the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for
the direct election of senators.92 He was also an outspoken advocate of
women's suffrage and led early efforts that culminated in the passage of
the Nineteenth Amendment.? So, too, on the floor of the Senate,
Sutherland vigorously opposed the extension of federal power in the
Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Antitrust Act, and other statutes that
he believed unduly intruded on the rights of individuals and the interests
of business.94 Thus, when President Warren Harding nominated
Sutherland to the Court in 1921, he was already a well-known public
figure; indeed, the Senate promptly confirmed Sutherland without
referring him to committee and without discussion of the nomination. It
came as little surprise that Sutherland, as one of the "Four Horsemen" of
the New Deal opposition, voted to invalidate New Deal programs.
Besides Taft, Charles Evans Hughes was the most prominent and
accomplished politician to serve on the Court. Appointed by Taft,
Hughes joined the Supreme Court as an Associate Justice in 19io, four
days after his term as Governor of New York ended.? Hughes resigned
from the Court to run for President in 1916, when he was the Republican
Party candidate against Woodrow Wilson." The election was one of the
closest in history, with a Hughes electoral defeat of 277-to-254 and a
popular split of 49.2 to 46.1%." After the close election, Hughes
remained in private practice through the war and returned to public life
88. Id. at 298-99.
89. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 2io U.S. 28i (1908) (Moody, J.)
(upholding the Safety Appliance Act of 1905).
90. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (Moody, J.) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination did not apply in state courts).
91. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 348-49.
92. Id. at 348.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 349.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 349-50.
97. See id. at 308; see also infra Table A.
98. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICEs, supra note 34, at 309.
99. WILLIAM C. BINNING, LARRY E. ESTERLY, & PAUL A. SRACIc, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
PARTIES, CAMPAIGNS, AND ELECTIONS 215 (1999).
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as Harding's Secretary of State.1" When Taft resigned from the seat of
Chief Justice in 1930, President Hoover appointed Hughes to succeed the
man responsible for his original appointment -incidentally, the only
other Chief Justice to lose a presidential election to Woodrow Wilson.'
This sequence of events laid over a contemporary twenty-year
period seems unfathomable. Imagine George H.W. Bush appointing
then-Senator Bob Dole to the Supreme Court in 1989, Dole resigning to
run against then-Governor Bill Clinton, President George W. Bush
appointing his father to be Chief Justice, and an imaginary President
John McCain appointing Dole to succeed him. This would seem
ridiculous to many modern political observers. But need that be so? Both
Taft, a former President, and Hughes, a former presidential candidate,
Secretary of State, governor of a large and powerful state, and-
amazingly-a former Associate Justice more than a decade earlier, were
so well-known at the time that it would have been hard to fathom how a
Court of individuals unknown to the public could ever exist. And as
Chief Justice, these two men did not lead a Court composed only of
career judges, but of other distinguished politicians whose electoral
careers had more or less come to an end.
Career politicians did not always "retire" to the Court; some left
politics at the height of their national standing and served long and
distinguished terms on the Court. Hugo Black, for example, was a two-
term Senator when he became Franklin Roosevelt's first appointment to
the Supreme Court.0 2 Elected in 1927 to represent Alabama, Black was
an ardent New Dealer, having voted for all twenty-four of Roosevelt's
New Deal programs." When Willis Van Devanter, one of the famed
Four Horsemen, resigned, Roosevelt sought a "thumping, evangelical
New Dealer" to fill his seat.0 4 As a legislator, Black had already gained
visibility on the national stage as the chairman of the committee that
investigated the Air Mail Scandal, a holdover from the Hoover
administration that "exposed misappropriation of government subsidies
by shipping and airline companies and corrupt lobbying practices by
notables such as press baron William Randolph Hearst."' In this
capacity, he earned front-page news coverage across the country in the
fall of 1933, with Newsweek calling him a "useful Torquemada."516 Black
was a "vigorous, aggressive Democratic politician," who fit the bill
ioo. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 309.
o i. Id.
102. Id. at 378.
103. See HOWARD BALL, HUGo L. BLACK: COLD STEEL wARRIOR 91 (1996).
10o4. Id.
105s. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICEs, suipra note 34, at 379.
so6. BALL, supra note 103, at 8x.
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Roosevelt had set out to accomplish." In addition, Roosevelt expressed
the need for a confirmable candidate from the South, a region
underrepresented on the Court."os Before his appointment in 1937, Black
vocally supported both court-packing and the direct election of federal
judges.0 9 Even before the President's controversial court-packing scheme
was introduced, Black had written to Roosevelt suggesting that the Court
be expanded by two Justices "and that the larger court could sit in two
panels.',"o This was not the only radical change Black supported during
his Senate terms. In 1935, Black, from the Senate floor, suggested
amending the Constitution to provide for the direct election of federal
judges. "If I had my way," said Black, "the Constitution to the United
States would be amended so as to provide that the federal judges should
be elected, because I believe in a democracy, and I believe in the election
of judges by the people themselves."" Black's appointment was not
without controversy. He was not permitted to enjoy the norm of
senatorial courtesy that usually followed the appointment to the Court of
a fellow Senator."' Instead, his nomination was referred to the Judiciary
Committee, the first time a fellow Senator's nomination would be
scrutinized in that fashion since 1853."3 The revelation of Black's former
membership in the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) caused a year-long national
sensation."4 Time called the nomination a "bombshell" and noted that
the anti-New Dealers viewed Black "as a Roosevelt trick to ram the
furthest Left-winger available down the Senate's throat.""5 Nevertheless,
Black's nomination passed the Senate sixty-three to sixteen in August of
'x6
1937.
Black's realigning appointment in 1937 may be contrasted with the
attempted rightward realignment of the Court that occurred under
President Richard Nixon. Powell succeeded Black on January 7, 1972,
the same day that Rehnquist joined the Court."7 Together with
Blackmun and Burger, Nixon's two other appointees, these four relative
unknowns to the public sphere cut far different figures from the
appointees of Roosevelt. While both Roosevelt and Nixon could claim
107. Id. at 92.
io8. Id. at 9i.
109. Id. at 86-87.
iio. Id. at 87-88.
i ii. Id. at 86.
112. For an illuminating discussion of the historical role of "senatorial courtesy" in the federal
appointments process, see GERHARDT, supra note 79, at 63-69.
113. BALL, Supra note 103, at 94.
114. Id. at 95-98.
115. Id. at 93 (quoting Judiciary: Norninee No. 93, TIME, Aug. 23, 1937, at 13, 14).
i16. IcL at 94-95. Scholars have often ranked Hugo Black as among the "great" Supreme Court
Justices. BADER & MERSKY, supra note 24, at 26-27.
117. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES. Supra note 34, at 498.
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electoral mandates for their ideological predilections, the two Presidents
went about the task of realigning the Court by picking from markedly
different pools of talent. Roosevelt's nine appointees were diverse, and
all but two joined the Court with clear records of their views and political
activities. Along with Black the Senator sat Reed the Solicitor General,
Frankfurter the academic, Douglas the SEC Chairman, Murphy the
Governor and Attorney General, Byrnes the Governor, Congressman,
Senator, and Secretary of State, Jackson the Attorney General, and
Rutledge-Roosevelt's last appointee and the only circuit judge he
nominated."' By contrast, Nixon's first order of business was to appoint
Warren Burger, a circuit judge with whom he was familiar from the
Eisenhower years and about whose views he had read in US News &
World Report, to replace Earl Warren." 9 Blackmun was also a circuit
judge, an Eisenhower appointee, and Powell was President of the
American Bar Association.20 Rehnquist was one of the more obscure
Associate Justice nominees in history and one of the most unlikely: We
learn from the Nixon tapes that it was the peculiar alchemy of Senator
Howard Baker's dithering over the nomination and Rehnquist's law
school grades (he was valedictorian of his class at Stanford) that won
Nixon over in a three-minute conversation with Attorney General John
Mitchell."2
Appointing politicians to the Court need not politicize the
judiciary."' Politicians who have joined the Court have often shown that
they view their judicial roles quite differently from their former roles in
the legislative or executive branch. Robert H. Jackson, for example, took
positions on the Supreme Court directly opposed to opinions he had
written as Attorney General.'23 In McGrath v. Kristensen, Justice Jackson
concurred with Justice Reed's holding that a Danish national who
worked illegally in the U.S. during World War II was not barred from
obtaining citizenship by applying for relief from military service as a
neutral alien, and that the Attorney General should not have refused to
suspend his deportation." 4 In his concurrence, Jackson wrote:
I concur in the judgment and opinion of the Court. But since it is
contrary to an opinion which, as Attorney General, I rendered in 1940,
I18. See infra Table A.
I19. JOHN WESLEY DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT
THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 12-13 (2001).
120. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 493; TOMLINS, supra note 66, at 457.
121. See DEAN, supra note II9, at 245-46.
122. The degree to which the Court acts as a political body is a matter of dispute. For one spirited
account of the Court as a political body, see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term-
Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 34 (2oo5) ("T]o the extent the Court is a
constitutional court, it is a political body.").
123. See McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 173-75 (majority opinion).
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I owe some word of explanation. I am entitled to say of that opinion
what any discriminating reader must think of it-that it was as foggy as
the statute the Attorney General was asked to interpret. It left the
difficult borderline questions posed by the Secretary of War
unanswered, covering its lack of precision with generalities which,
however, gave off overtones of assurance that the Act applied to nearly
every alien from a neutral country caught in the United States under
almost any circumstances which required him to stay overnight.
The opinion did not at all consider aspects of our diplomatic history,
which I now think, and should think I would then have thought, ought
to be considered in applying any conscription Act to aliens.'
Jackson's appreciation, reflected in this concurrence, of the
difference between the role of an Attorney General in advocating for the
government and the role of Supreme Court Justice led a former staffer at
the Justice Department to write in an obituary:
A lawyer he had been, and a lawyer he remained until he took his
place on the Supreme Court. The separate roles of the client, the
lawyer and the judge were always clear to him; and so we find Mr.
Justice Jackson, with complete equanimity, rejecting an opinion of
Attorney General Jackson as "earlier partisan advocacy." 126
Sherman Minton provides a further example of the politician who
recognizes the different role of a judge. Minton, a Truman appointee,
joined the Court in 1949 and served until ill health and ideological
isolation dispirited him and led to his resignation in 1956." Though
Minton would cut a much different figure from his former Senate
colleague Hugo Black during his relatively short tenure on the Court,
both served in the Senate during Roosevelt's second term and both were
ardent New Dealers."' However, Minton's journey to the Court would be
much longer. Elected to serve in the Senate representing Indiana in 1934
and failing to secure reelection in 1940, Minton charted an unusual
political course for a modern Senator. Having supported, like Black,
Roosevelt's court-packing scheme, Minton rose to the level of Senate
Majority Whip before Roosevelt appointed him to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals after the loss of his Senate seat.' 9 During his eight
years of service on the intermediate court, Minton was known for judicial
restraint, a record he took with him to the Supreme Court, joining
Frankfurter's conservative wing.' 30 As a circuit judge during World War
II, Minton had the opportunity to rule on challenges to recent New Deal
125. Id. at 176-77 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
126. Warner W. Gardner, Government Attorney, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 438. 438 (955) (quoting
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S- 579, 649 n-17 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
127. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICEs, supra note 34. at 433-35.
128. Id. at 379, 432.
129. Id at 433.
13o. Id.
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legislation he himself had a hand in drafting, a degree of experience that
from some views could be seen as a great aid to judicial activity.
Regardless, given Minton's history in politics as an elected New Dealer,
few could have predicted he would ultimately become part of the Court's
conservative wing."'
The last great modern example of a politician on the Supreme Court
is Earl Warren. Warren was not only the last Chief Justice, but also the
last Justice altogether, to come to the Court with an impressive national
profile and history of electoral success. Before his appointment in 1953,
he was a popular three-term Governor of California, the position from
which he resigned to serve on the Court.'32 Warren was also the
Republican candidate for Vice President on the Dewey ticket in 1948,
and he abandoned his own liberal Republican presidential campaign in
1952 only in the formidable shadow of the center-right Eisenhower
candidacy.'33 As Governor, Warren supported internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War 11,134 an issue of particular importance in
California that caused national controversy. In his run for reelection as
Governor in 1946, Warren ran effectively unopposed by the other major
parties, the Democrats and Progressives."' The following year, Warren
repealed all state school segregation laws, shortly after the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the segregation of Mexican students into Mexican-only schools
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.136 Amici curiae in that case
included the NAACP, which submitted a brief written by Thurgood
Marshall and Robert Carter,'37 both of whom would persuade Chief
Justice Warren and eight other Justices to reach the same conclusion in
1954." Warren's vice-presidential candidacy on the Republican ticket in
1948 was progressive, with the Dewey platform endorsing expansion of
Social Security, federal funding for public housing, and civil rights
legislation.' No Justice since has ever stood as a candidate for one of the
country's only two nationally-elected offices, and for readers of the
131. Id.
132. Id. at 437-38.
133. Id. at 438; NEWTON, supra note 20, at 209-10, 249. Neither candidate was the darling of the
conservative wing. Bob Taft was the clear favorite for the far right. LEO KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A
POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 208, 267-71 (1967); NEWTON, supra, at 241.
134. Arval A. Morris, Justice, War, and the Japanese-American Evacuation and Internment (1984),
reprinted in CHARLES MCCLAIN, THE MASS INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR
LEGAL REDRESS 157 (1994) (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERMENT CASES (1983)).
135. NEWTON, supra note 20, at 196-97.
136. Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 551 (C.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 774,
775 (9th Cir. 1947) (en banc).
137. Mendez, i6i F.2d at 775.
138. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
139. Republican Party Platform of 1948, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=2 5 83 6
(last visited June 24, 2010).
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Chicago Tribune, Warren was Vice President-Elect for a Tuesday
night. 140
On October 9, 1953, one week after Warren took his seat, in a letter
to his brother Milton, President Eisenhower expressed sentiments very
similar to those Washington and de Tocqueville endorsed in the
statements reproduced at the beginning of this Article. He summed up
his motivation for appointing a perceived liberal from California
succinctly:
I believe that we need statesmanship on the Supreme Court.
Statesmanship is developed in the hard knocks of a general experience,
private and public. Naturally, a man occupying the post must be
competent in the law-and Warren has had seventeen years of practice
in public law, during which his record was one of remarkable
accomplishment and success, to say nothing of dedication. He has been
very definitely a liberal-conservative; he represents the kind of
political, economic, and social thinking that I believe we need on the
Supreme Court. Finally, he has a national name for integrity,
uprightness, and courage that, again, I believe we need on the Court.'
Yet the President's spirited defense of his nominee and the public,
political character he desired from Warren were not without controversy
at the time-indeed Eisenhower himself acknowledged the heterodoxy
of Warren's politics, but also identified with his "liberal-conservative"
stripe.142 Eisenhower's letter was mostly a response to challenges from
politicians and intellectuals in his brother's academic and political
circle-named and unnamed-who believed the President was being
"circumvented by the forces of reaction in the Republican Party-by
blind and selfish men who are hostile to all that he stands for, and who
are playing on his inexperience in politics to seize power once more for
the Old Guard leaders," 43 and that "nothing in [Warren's] record
qualified him for the post of Chief Justice. His legal experience is
scant."" While the veracity of these statements is subject to debate
(Eisenhower disagreed, and as for legal experience, Warren was
Attorney General of California for a full four-year term after fourteen
years as a district attorney), 45 there is no doubt that the qualities
Eisenhower sought could be objectively evaluated by the Senate, by
other peers in government, and most importantly by the American
140. See, e.g., "Dewey Defeats Truman" (Memory): American Treasures of the Library of
Congress, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm145.html (last visited June 24, 2010).
141. Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Milton S. Eisenhower (Oct. 9, 1953), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENCY: THE MIDDLE WAY 576, 576 (Louis Galambos &
Daun Van Ee eds., 1996), available at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/
documents/46o.cfm.
142. Id.
343. Id. at n.2 (quoting author and diplomat Nicholas Roosevelt).
344. Id. at n.4 (quoting author and diplomat Nicholas Roosevelt).
345. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICEs, supra note 34, at 437.
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public. And regardless of whether Eisenhower did so publicly, he
implicitly acknowledged privately that the President's selection of a
Supreme Court Justice is a political decision whose parameters are
determined partly by his electoral mandate.
Warren retired in June, 1969, and was replaced by veteran D.C.
Circuit Judge Warren Burger. When Hugo Black retired in September
1971, the Court lost its last statesman. Black's seat was filled by Lewis
Powell, whose only position of prominence was as President of the
American Bar Association. No Justice appointed after Powell has had
recognition on the national level, and all but two, Rehnquist and
O'Connor, have arrived via the circuit courts. Before Black's retirement,
the only period in the Court's history in which it lacked a prominent
politician was between the death of Lucius Q.C. Lamar (former U.S.
Representative and Senator and President Grover Cleveland's Secretary
of the Interior) on January 23, 1893, and the arrival of Howell Jackson
(former Senator) on March 4, 1893.146
With the end of the era of politicians on the Court, so too has ended
the commitment to regional diversity on the Court. Not only is the
Supreme Court today a delegation of circuit court judges, but four of the
current Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas) arrived from
the prestigious D.C. Circuit. 47 With one Justice from each of the First
(Breyer), Second (Sotomayor), and Third (Alito) Circuits, Justices
Stevens (from the Seventh Circuit) and Kennedy (from the Ninth
Circuit) are the only Justices who did not originate from what
commentators have dubbed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Acela
Circuit.'4' The only southerner on the Court today is Clarence Thomas.
Even more strikingly, three of the sitting Justices (Scalia, Sotomayor, and
Ginsburg) hail from New York City. In the nineteenth century, there
were state- and region-bound seats (e.g., the "New York seat" or the
"western seat")149 that were maintained by way of informal political
norms.15 0 For example, when Grover Cleveland needed to fill the New
York seat upon Samuel Blatchford's death in 1893, he proposed to New
York's Senators three possible candidates from their state.,' Only after
the New York Senators resisted those choices did Cleveland nominate
146. See infra Table A. During this period, the following Justices, none of whom held prominent
public office, were members of the Court: Melville Fuller, Samuel Blatchford, Horace Gray, Stephen
Field, Henry Brown, George Shiras, David Brewer, and John Marshall Harlan. See infra Table A.
147. See infra Table A.
148. See Adam Liptak, Obama Has Chance to Select Justice With Varied Resumd, N.Y. TIMEs, May
I, 2009, at AtI.
149. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 94, 1o3.




Edward White, a Louisiana Senator, who was confirmed.' Similarly,
Abraham Lincoln nominated Stephen Field, a California Judge, as the
tenth Justice to a seat created specifically to bring California into the
political fold.' Today's bureaucratic Court lacks the regional diversity
that was once an important feature of a President's selection and, as a
result, the Supreme Court's representational makeup.
III. BUREAUCRACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The principal difficulty with a bureaucratic court is that it evades the
mechanisms of accountability that exist with respect to other kinds of
bureaucratic organizations. Government bureaucrats function beyond
the purview of the general public. Although bureaucrats may wield
enormous power, the public does not typically know who they are or
much about their functions. This is generally acceptable in a democracy,
because it is understood that bureaucrats are ultimately accountable to
an elected superior. Consider the following example: Most Americans do
not concern themselves with the day-to-day business of the
Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, or
even know who that person is during any given administration, at any
given time.' What does matter to the public is that the individual who
fills this office answers to Secretary of State Clinton and therefore
ultimately to President Obama, and that the Undersecretary can be
removed from her post if she performs poorly or violates the public's
trust. Moving down the hierarchical chain of command, there are
thousands of trained civil servants in the State Department who are all
nameless to the public, from ambassadors down to the consular officials
who process the paperwork for a citizen's passport or a foreigner's visa.
The policies these individuals execute are ultimately set by elected
officials, and the individuals themselves are replaceable. Because
bureaucrats can be readily dismissed, there is no need for the public to be
involved in, or even aware of, the process for filling particular positions
within the bureaucracy. There is no need to ensure accountability at the
front end because it is assured at the back end.
With the bureaucratic Court, however, there are checks at neither
the front nor the back ends. Supreme Court Justices enjoy lifetime
appointments. While a Justice may be impeached, impeachment requires
much more egregious behavior than would result in an ordinary
152. Id.
153. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra flute 34, at 188-89-
'54. The current Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is Judith
McHale. See U.S. Dep't of State, Biography of Judith McHale, www.state.gov/r/paleilbiog/I24007.htm
(last visited June 24, 2010).
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bureaucrat being fired and is, accordingly, very rare."' And while
Supreme Court decisions on constitutional questions may be overturned
by constitutional amendment, that process, too, is arduous.16
Thus, when it comes to a lifetime position, the opportunities for
screening and accountability must exist prior to the appointment because
they evaporate once the individual is confirmed for the job. However,
the Supreme Court nominee who has advanced through the ranks of the
federal judiciary has largely evaded the sort of public scrutiny that exists
with respect to nominees who have served in national political office.
Hence, the recent nominees to the Court, plucked from the circuit courts,
have been unknown to the public and are not well known even to legal
professionals.
The bureaucratic judge has, of course, been vetted prior to joining
the lower federal court. But this is a poor substitute for the screening a
national politician receives. Few people pay any attention to nominations
to the circuit courts and fewer still to district court nominations, though
the politically-charged environment growing around lower court
appointments may be a function of the increased importance of obtaining
such appointments in order to advance to the Supreme Court."' More
importantly, in the bureaucratic model, the nominees for the lower
federal courts are typically individuals who have performed satisfactorily,
and sometimes with distinction, as lawyers. Because they are not
individuals with a national profile, there is little basis for the public to
assess whether they will perform well as a lower court judge, let alone
down the road as a Supreme Court Justice. The same problems of
screening and accountability therefore emerge with respect to lower
court nominations as well. Any vetting at that stage is necessarily
incomplete because it occurs too early in the long road to the Supreme
Court.
155. Samuel Chase is the only Justice to have been impeached (in 1804) and he was acquitted by
the Senate. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HisToRIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992) (detailing the events). William
Douglas was threatened with impeachment in 1951 and again in 1970. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,
supra note 34, at 394-95. Abe Fortas resigned "in the face of public condemnation and talk of
impeachment." Id. at 475.
156. Only four rulings of the Supreme Court have been directly overturned by constitutional
amendments: Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 ('793), was overturned by the Eleventh
Amendment; Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i9 How.) 393 (1856), was overturned by the Fourteenth
Amendment; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), was overturned by the
Sixteenth Amendment; and Oregon v. Mitchell, 4oo U.S. 112 (1970), was overturned by the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment.
157. For an overview of the atmosphere of lower court appointments, largely ignored by the
general public but acutely felt by politicians and activists, see NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS:
POLIICIANs, Acruisms, AND THE LowER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 1-4 (2005).
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Presidential elections are likewise a poor mechanism for public
oversight of Supreme Court nominees who come from the circuit courts.
Although Supreme Court decisions can be an element of presidential
campaigns, presidential candidates do not typically promise to appoint
particular lower court judges to the Supreme Court. Such a promise
would be foolhardy given that the President might not have an
opportunity to fill a seat on the Court at all, and that the appointment
would require the Senate's approval. Even if a candidate did make such a
promise, it would likely be of little meaning to voters who are not in a
position to evaluate the named judge or the value of the candidate's
promise.
This leaves the confirmation process itself as the only opportunity
for the public to assure itself that a nominee is a sound pick for the
Court. However, the confirmation process for the bureaucratic judge
does not serve this function well. For one thing, the public does not hear
from the nominee from the moment of nomination to the start of the
confirmation hearing. There are no television interviews or town hall
meetings. The public sees only a mute candidate photographed visiting
with a senator. With the candidate silent, and in the absence of a public
profile and reputation, the mass media has to compensate, filling the
public relations gap between the nominee and the people. Thus,
immediately after Judge Sotomayor was nominated to the Supreme
Court, magazines and newspapers devoted pages to her life story,
complete with childhood photographs and interviews with friends and
family."' Prior to the actual hearing, we may learn about the candidate
from others, but we learn nothing from the candidate.
As for the actual confirmation hearing, it too fails the public. As the
most recent Supreme Court confirmation hearings demonstrate, there is
almost a consensus among the participants that the individuals
nominated to author the most important judicial opinions should have no
opinions of their own. From John Roberts's depiction of judge as
umpire' to Sonia Sotomayor's description of judging as involving
"fidelity to the law,""' nominees now present themselves as the law's
158. See Richard Lacayo, Sonia Sotomayor: A Justice Like No Other, TIME, May 28, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/o,8599,1901348,oo.html.
159. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr To Be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o9th Cong. 55 (2oo5) [hereinafter Roberts
Confirmation Hearings] (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
congress/senate/judiciary/sh1o9-158/browse.html ("Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the
rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays
by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see an umpire.").
16o. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be An Associate
Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, i Ith Gong. 59 (2009) [hereinafter
Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings] (statement of Jud ge Sonia Sotomayor), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/shsill-5o3/browse.html ("In the past month, many
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servants, robotically applying legal rules to the case at hand so that
judging is entirely removed from the personal qualities of the jurist. At
every turn, the nominee is required to profess faith that the law always
provides the answer. Efforts to prod the nominee into admitting what
any legal professional knows-that the law does not always supply the
answer, particularly in cases heard by the Supreme Court-result in the
nominee expressing, ever more vigorously, faith in the law's guiding
hand."'
Senators who support the nominee ask questions to provide the
nominee an opportunity to reinforce this image; Senators who oppose
aim to trick the nominee into betraying the image by expressing a
viewpoint. Accordingly, by the time they enter the hearing room,
nominees have undergone hours of rigorous training in how to answer
questions without saying anything that would reveal them to be anything
more than faithful enforcers of the law. Besides (selective) invocation of
the "rule" against discussing issues that might come before the Court,
senators have asked me about my judicial philosophy. Simple: fidelity to the law. The task of a judge is
not to make law. It is to apply the law.").
161. There are numerous examples from the most recent hearings. Here are three:
SEN. GRASSLEY: Well, just suppose that Congress had not even acted in a certain
area and there are people that are bringing cases before the court that would give an
opportunity to fill in on something that Congress didn't do. What about in-
ALITO: The judiciary is not a law-making body. Congress is the law-making body.
Congress has the legislative power and the judiciary has to perform its role and not try to
perform the role of Congress or the Executive.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr To Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, logth Cong. 356 (2oo6)
[hereinafter Alito Confirmation Hearings], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/
judiciary/shlo9-277/browse.html.
SEN. KYL: Do you agree with [President Obama] that the law only takes you the first
25 miles of a marathon and that that last mile has to be decided by what's in the judge's
heart?
SOTOMAYOR: I can only explain what I think judges should do, which is judges can't
rely on what's in their heart. They don't determine the law. Congress makes the laws. The
job of a judge is to apply the law. And so it's not the heart that compels conclusions in cases.
It's the law. The judge applies the law to the facts before that judge.
Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, supra note 16o, at i2o.
SEN. GRASSLEY: Well, is there any room in constitutional interpretation for the
judge's own values or beliefs?
ROBERTS: No, I don't think there is. Sometimes it's hard to give meaning to a
constitutional term in a particular case. But you don't look to your own values and beliefs.
You look outside yourself to other sources.
Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 159, at 178.
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nominees come to the hearing with six rhetorical devices, now standard
components of the question-and-answer sessions, to stay on script:
(i) Admit, Do Not Accept. The first device is for the nominee to
respond to questions about whether he or she agrees with a prior
Supreme Court decision by stating that the Supreme Court has indeed
rendered the decision. Samuel Alito used this device in the following
exchange with Arlen Specter:
SEN. SPECTER: Well, Griswold dealt with the right to privacy on
contraception for married women. Do you agree with that?
ALITO: I agree that Griswold is now I think understood by the
Supreme Court as based on the Liberty Clauses of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the [Fourteenth] Amendment."
While a literal answer to Specter's question, Alito's response does
not address what he was plainly being asked: whether he agreed with
Griswold itself. Sonia Sotomayor deployed the same device in this
exchange with Senator Kohl about the Supreme Court's decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey:
SEN. KOHL: Do you agree with Justices Souter, O'Connor and
Kennedy in their opinion in Casey, which reaffirmed the core holding
in Roe?
SOTOMAYOR: As I said, I- Casey reaffirmed the holding in Roe.
That is the Supreme Court's settled interpretation of what the core
holding is and its reaffirmance of it.'"
(2) Describe What Was Done, Not What You Will Do. A second
device is for nominees, when asked how they will approach a question, to
respond by describing how the Supreme Court has approached the
question and the reasons it has supplied for its approach. The following
three exchanges illustrate how Sotomayor and Roberts each used this
device:
SEN. DEWINE: In your opinion, what role should a judge play
when reviewing congressional fact findings? In your view, how much
deference do congressional fact findings deserve?
ROBERTS: Again, and of course, without getting into the
particulars, the reason that congressional fact finding and
determination is important in these cases is because the courts
recognize that they can't do that. Courts can't have, as you said,
whatever it was, the 13 separate hearings before passing particular
legislation. Courts-the Supreme Court can't sit and hear witness after
witness after witness in a particular area and develop that kind of a
record. Courts can't make the policy judgments about what type of
legislation is necessary in light of the findings that are made. So the
findings play an important role, and I think it is correct to say under
the law in this area and others, they're neither necessary nor
162. Alito Confirmation Hearings, supra note i6i, at 318.
163. Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, supra note i6o, at 82.
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necessarily sufficient. But I know as a judge that they're extremely
helpful when there are findings.
And judges know when they look at those, that they're the result of
an exhaustive process of a sort that the Court cannot duplicate. We
simply don't have the institutional expertise or the resources or the
authority to engage in that type of a process. So that is sort of the basis
for the deference to the fact finding that is made. It's institutional
competence. The courts don't have it. Congress does. It's constitutional
authority. It's not our job. It is your job. So the deference to
congressional findings in this area has a solid basis."'
SEN. KOHL: [T]ell us how you will decide when it is appropriate to
alter, amend or even overrule precedent.
SOTOMAYOR: The doctrine of stare decisis is a doctrine that
looks to the value in the stability, consistency, predictability of
precedent. And it starts from the principles that precedent are
important values to the society because it helps those goals. It also
guides judges in recognizing that those who have come before them,
the judges who have looked at these issues, have applied careful
thought to the question and view things in a certain way, and a court
should-a judge should exercise some humility and caution in
disregarding the thoughts and conclusions of others who came-who
came in that position before them.
But that's not to suggest that the doctrine says that precedence is
immutable. And, in fact, I believe that England had an experiment
with the question and-and it was not horribly successful. Precedents
are precedents. They're not immutable, they have to change in certain
circumstances. And those circumstances generally have been described
by Justice Souter in the Casey case, are probably the best articulation
people have come to in sort of talking about the factors that courts
think about.65
SEN. KOHL: Judge, Bush v. Gore. Many critics saw the Bush v.
Gore decision as an example of the judiciary improperly injecting itself
into a political dispute. In your opinion, should the Supreme Court
even have decided to get involved in Bush v. Gore?
SOTOMAYOR: That case took the attention of the nation, and
there's been so much discussion about what the court did or didn't do.
I look at the case, and my reaction as a sitting judge is not to criticize it
or to challenge it, even if I were disposed that way, because I don't
take a position on that; that the Court took and made the decision it
did.
The question for me, as I look at that sui generis situation-it's only
happened once in the lifetime of our country-is that some good came
from that discussion. There's been and was enormous electoral process
changes in many states as a result of the flaws that were reflected in the
164. Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 159, at 218.
x65. Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, supra note x6o, at 397-98-
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process that went on. That is a tribute to the greatness of our American
system, which is whether you agree or disagree with a Supreme Court
decision, that all of the branches become involved in the conversation
of how to improve things. And as I indicated, both Congress, who
devoted a very significant amount of money to electoral reform in its
legislation-and states have looked to address what happened there."
(3) Generalize. A different device is for nominees to respond to
specific questions with vague generalities that provide no indication of
what the nominee's answer to the actual question really is. Here is
Samuel Alito using this device:
SEN. SPECTER: But do you think there is as fundamental a
concern as legitimacy of the Court would be involved if Roe were to be
overturned?
ALITO: Mr. Chairman, I think that the legitimacy of the court
would be undermined in any case if the Court made a decision based
on its perception of public opinion. It should make its decisions based
on the Constitution and the law.... [I]t should not sway in the wind of
public opinion at any time."
(4) Legalize the Personal. When asked about their personal beliefs,
nominees use the device of responding as though they are being asked
about what the law says. Roberts did this in the following exchange with
Senator Feinstein:
SEN. FEINSTEIN: Do you [believe in the separation of church and
state]?
ROBERTS: Senator, I think the reason we have the two clauses in
the Constitution in the First Amendment reflects the Framers'
experience. Many of them or their immediate ancestors were fleeing
religious persecution. They were fleeing established churches. And it
makes perfect sense to put those two provisions together, no
establishment of religion and guaranteeing free exercise. That reflected
the Framers' experience. 68
(5) Make the Specific Abstract. Another commonly deployed device
is for the nominee to deem specific questions too abstract such that-
alas-nobody could possibly provide an answer. See how Alito and
Roberts recast plain questions as abstract inquiries in these exchanges:
SEN. LEAHY: And if the President were to authorize somebody to
torture or say that he would immunize somebody from prosecution for
doing that, he wouldn't have that power, would he?
ALITO: Well, Senator, I think the important points are that the
President has to follow Constitution and the laws, and it is up to
Congress to exercise its legislative power. But as to specific issues that
might come up, I really need to know the specifics. I need to know
i66. Id. at 80-8i.
167. Alito Confirmation Hearings, supra note 16i, at 319.
i68. Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 159, at 227.
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what was done and why it was done, and hear the arguments on the
issue.'69
SEN. LEAHY: Do we [Congress] have the power to terminate war?
We have the power to declare war. Do we have the power to terminate
war?
ROBERTS: Senator, that's a question that I don't think can be
answered in the abstract. You need to know the particular
circumstances and exactly what the facts are and what the legislation
would be like, because the argument on the other side-and as a judge,
I would obviously be in a position of considering both arguments, the
argument for the Legislature and the argument for the Executive. The
argument on the Executive side will rely on authority as Commander
in Chief, and whatever authorities derive from that. So it's not
something that can be answered in the abstract.70
(6) Make Past Personal Statements Ambiguous. Often, nominees are
confronted with statements they have made in speeches, on job
applications, in casual conversations, or in published writings that appear
inconsistent with the vision of the judge as lacking in views and opinions.
Rather than admit error, nominees deem such statements to have been
poorly worded or misunderstood. Federal judges, whose tools are words,
plead linguistic clumsiness. Here are two examples:
SEN. KENNEDY: Now, in 1985, in your job application to the
Justice Department, you wrote, "I believe very strongly in the
supremacy of the elected branches of Government." Those are your
words, am I right?
ALITO: It's an inapt phrase, and I certainly didn't mean that
literally at the time, and I wouldn't say that today. The branches of
Government are equal. They have different responsibilities, but they
are all equal, and no branch is supreme to the other branches.
SEN. KENNEDY: So you have changed your mind?
ALITO: No, I haven't changed my mind, Senator, but the phrasing
there is very misleading and incorrect. I think what I was getting at is
the fact that our Constitution gives the judiciary a particular role, and
there are instances in which it can override the judgments that are
made by Congress and by the Executive, but for the most part our
Constitution leaves it to the elected branches of Government to make
the policy decisions for our country.'
SEN. CORNYN: You said that a wise Latina woman would reach a
better conclusion than a male counterpart. What I am confused about
is, are you standing by that statement? Or are you saying that it was a
bad idea and, are you disavowing that statement?
169. Alito Confirmation Hearings, supra note i6i, at 328.
170. Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 159, at 151-52.
171. Alito Confirmation Hearings, supra note 16i, at 346-47.
1381
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
SOTOMAYOR: It is clear from the attention that my words have
gotten and the manner in which it has been understood by some people
that my words failed. They didn't work. . . . I stand by the words. It fell
flat. And I understand that some people have understood them in a
way that I never intended and I would hope that, in the context of the
speech, that they would be understood."'
The end result is that, as conducted today, the confirmation hearings
for Supreme Court Justices reveal virtually nothing about the nominee.
Over and over, the Senators asking the questions appear content with an
affirmation of the proper role of the judge and rarely push for a more
direct answer to a specific inquiry. Moreover, a Senator who thinks the
nominee is insufficiently forthcoming cannot do much about it. Senators
are typically asking questions that staffers wrote. The frustrated Senator
therefore often does not know how to ask good follow-up questions. The
nominee who is a lower court judge also knows more about the law than
any Senator on the Judiciary Committee. Protocol seems often to
prevent Senators from interrupting the nominee during an answer, and
nominees can run out the clock with long-winded recitations."' And, of
course, the nominee has any and all of the six rhetorical devices to play
as trumps.
If the confirmation hearings do not reveal much about a nominee's
suitability for the Supreme Court, nor does a nominee's record as a lower
court judge. At their confirmation hearings, nominees invoke their
judicial records as evidence of their qualifications. In reality, however, a
solid record as a circuit or district court judge is not good evidence of
how the nominee will perform on the Supreme Court. To be sure, one's
record as a lower court judge can demonstrate qualities that are as
relevant to the position of Supreme Court Justice as they are to many
other professional positions: writing ability, work habits, organizational
skills, and intellect. However, there is a vast gulf between the substantive
work of a lower federal judge and the substantive work of a Supreme
Court Justice. Most of the work of lower court judges is formulaic. The
lower court judge decides largely routine matters for which there are
indeed usually clear legal answers.174 By contrast, the Supreme Court
today hears the cases that present the most difficult questions and raise
issues of law that have produced confusion and disagreement. Lower
172. Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, supra note 16o, at 327.
173. In announcing he would vote against confirming Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court,
Arizona Senator Jon Kyl complained: "She knew she could dissemble and delay and run out the clock,
and she did." Jan Crawford Greenburg, Kyl to Vote Against Sotomayor, ABC NEws, July 22, 2009,
http://blogs.abcnews.com/legalities/20o9/o7/kyl-to-vote-against-sotomayor.html.
'74. See Ruth Bader Ginshurg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. II85. 1192-93
(1992) ("[U]nlike the Supreme Court, courts of appeals deal far less frequently with grand
constitutional questions than with less cosmic questions of statutory interpretation or the rationality of
agency or district court decisions.").
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courts judges are bound by Supreme Court precedents and subject to
review if they disregard or apply those precedents incorrectly. The
Supreme Court is not required to follow its own precedents, and there is
nobody to check it if it does not. Faithful application of precedent to
facts as a circuit court judge, the very thing recent nominees have
emphasized about their records,"' tells us little about what the nominee
will do when there is no precedent or when precedent need not be
followed.
Moreover, members of the public cannot easily evaluate a candidacy
that is based heavily on a prior judicial record. Most of the nominee's
judicial opinions will involve bland questions of law. Few judges write for
the general public. Ordinary members of the public cannot readily
evaluate a judge's work anymore than they can determine whether a
functionary in the Internal Revenue Service has performed assigned
tasks with distinction. At the hearing, the nominee can turn any cases
involving hot-button issues into dull technical issues or questions dictated
by precedent. Experts can weigh in on how the nominee has performed,
but negative assessments will be countered by positive evaluations, and
in any event, a long record will typically be neither wholly flawed nor
entirely perfect. The nomination process does not, therefore, provide a
basis for holding the nominee accountable for past actions or for
175. Roberts and Sotomayor both did this, as shown by the following exchanges:
SEN. DURBIN: What is in your background or experience that can convince the
members of this Committee and the American people that you are willing to stand up to
this President if he oversteps his authority in this time of war, even if it is an unpopular thing
to do?
ROBERTS: Well, Senator, I would just say that my demonstrated commitment to the
rule of law, you can see that, I think, in my opinions over the past 2 years, you can see it in
how I approach my job as a lawyer, arguing, and what types of arguments I make and how I
make those arguments and how faithful they are to the precedents, and you can see it in my
history of public service.
The idea that the rule of law-that's the only client I have as a judge. The Constitution is
the only interest I have as a judge. The notion that I would compromise my commitment to
that principle that has been the lodestar of my professional life since I became a lawyer
because of views toward a particular administration is one that I reject entirely. That would
be inconsistent with the judicial oath.
Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 159, at 279-80.
SEN. LEAHY: And isn't that what you, having been on the bench for 17 years, set as your
goal, to be fair and show integrity based on the law?
SOTOMAYOR: I believe my 17-year record on the two courts would show that, in
every case that I render, I first decide what the law requires under the facts before me, and
that what I do is explain to litigants why the law requires a result, and whether their position
is sympathetic or not, I explain why the result is commanded by law.
Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, supra note 160, at 67.
1383
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
generating confidence that all future mechanisms for accountability-lost
once the nominee is confirmed-will be unnecessary.
IV. POLITICIANS ON THE COURT
Returning politicians to the Court would confer a variety of
benefits. A former politician of exceptional ability and national standing
can bring to the Court a history of accountability in taking definite
stances on concrete legal and political issues. The nominee who has
suffered the slings and arrows of national electoral politics or has served
in a high profile administrative office with a public and consequential
political portfolio has acquired public trust before being placed in the
least accountable of all federal offices. If, for example, President Nixon's
two terms had not ended in the disgraceful improprieties and illegalities
of Watergate and President Reagan had nominated him to the Court, the
Senate would have had the opportunity to debate on a concrete record of
legislative and executive decisions behind which the electoral mandate of
an entire population had once stood. In a confirmation hearing, Nixon
could not have deflected criticism of his signing into law a bill he
believed to be unconstitutional by saying he was expressing the views of
a superior. By contrast, when Chief Justice Rehnquist was asked whether
and why he had written a memo to Justice Jackson defending Plessy's
doctrine of separate but equal, he could plausibly put the burden of
proving his views on a deceased superior."' A former President, Senator,
or agency head could attempt to lay the blame elsewhere, but would
have a far more difficult time going about it.
More recent events likewise demonstrate the benefits of drawing
from a pool of politicians of national stature. During the Supreme Court
nomination cycle of 2005-the year that saw the death of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the resignation of Justice O'Connor, and the nominations of
Harriet Miers, Samuel Alito, and John Roberts-Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales was widely rumored to be on President Bush's short-
list of potential nominees."' At the time, Gonzales had served less than a
year in his role as head of the Justice Department, but had judicial
experience on the Texas Supreme Court, from which he joined President
176. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 Geo. L.J.
49, 97 (2oo6); Cass Sunstein, From Law Clerk To Chief Justice. He Has Slighted Rights, L.A. TIMES,
May 17, 2004, at B13 (noting that Rehnquist justified the memo by explaining that it had been
intended as a statement of Jackson's views rather than of his own).
177. Emily Bazelon, The Gonzales Game: Is He Really the Best Supreme Court Pick Liberals Can
Hope For?, SLArE, July 12, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2I22293/; Dan Eggen. Possible Nominees to
the Suprerne Court, WASH. Posi, July i, 2ooS, available at http://wwwx.washingtonpost.com/
wp dynlcontentfarticle/2oo5/o7/or1/AR2oo507or oo0756.html; Editorial, No to Justice Gonzales, NATrL
REV., June 28, 2005, http://www.nationaireview.comleditorialleditors2oo506280858.asp.
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Bush's first administration as White House Counsel."' A Hispanic with
two decades of political experience in Texas and on the national scene, a
former judge with a Harvard Law degree, and a man in the confidence of
a two-term President, Gonzales had the profile and experience for a
nomination to the nation's highest court."' However, public scrutiny of
Gonzales's actions as Attorney General, including his role in firing
United States Attorneys, and his involvement in government programs
involving torture and wiretapping, led to Gonzales resigning and his
Supreme Court prospects likewise disappearing. so Public service thus
gives the public the opportunity to consider the qualities of a potential
nominee in ways that do not exist when the nominee is a lower court
judge.
A comparison of Gonzales's fate to that of Robert H. Jackson is
useful. Jackson's tenure as Attorney General was brief, much like that of
Gonzales.' 8' And, like Gonzales, Attorney General Jackson faced
controversy over wiretapping. Jackson publicly supported legislation that
would authorize broad wiretapping powers in criminal investigations and
for national security purposes.' As a result of public protests, Congress
failed to enact the law Jackson had sought.'83 Yet this controversy did not
foreclose Jackson's later appointment to the Court. Jackson had a
reservoir of political capital from his earlier and widely-admired service
as Solicitor General."' In addition, as Attorney General, Jackson
received public acclaim with his successful defense of Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal program.' When Roosevelt nominated Jackson
to the Court in 1941, Jackson's public profile was, on balance, positive.
Beyond the benefits of accountability, a former politician can give
legitimacy to judicial decisions. This may be particularly true when it
comes to decisions involving the scope of powers of the branches of
government. For example, on questions of presidential power, two of
Chief Justice Taft's opinions were in favor of a contested exercise of
178. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Biography of the Eightieth Attorney General, http://www.justice.gov/
ag/aghistpage.php?id=79 (last visited June 24, 2010).
179. Id.
18o. Bazelon, supra note 177; see also Emily Bazelon et al., Gone Gone Gone, He's Been Gonzo
Long: Alberto Gonzales Resigns. Finally., SLATE, Aug. 27, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2172855/.
18s. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 408.
182. See Memorandum from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, Subcomm. on Criminal Laws &
Procedures, to Senator John L. McClellan (Nov. 3, 1971), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
congress/senate/judiciary/sh92-69-267/249-252.pdf.
183. See GEOFFREY PERRErr, DAYS OF SADNESS, YEARS OF TRIUMPH: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 1939-
1945, at xor ('973).
184. In appreciation for Jackson's skill as an advocate, Justice Brandeis remarked that Jackson
should be "solicitor general for life." THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 408.
i85. See Gardner, supra note 126, at 442-
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presidential authority.186 In one of those cases, Myers v. United States,
Taft ruled that the President had the authority to dismiss executive
branch officials who had been confirmed by the Senate, notwithstanding
Congressional attempts to withhold that authority."' In defense of his
position, Taft wrote over a three-Justice dissent:
Made responsible under the Constitution for the effective
enforcement of the law, the President needs as an indispensable aid to
meet it the disciplinary influence upon those who act under him of a
reserve power of removal... . The degree of guidance in the discharge
of their duties that the President may exercise over executive officers
varies with the character of their service as prescribed in the law under
which they act. The highest and most important duties which his
subordinates perform are those in which they act for him. In such cases
they are exercising not their own but his discretion. This field is a very
large one. It is sometimes described as political....
In all such cases, the discretion to be exercised is that of the
President in determining the national public interest and in directing
the action to be taken by his executive subordinates to protect it. In
this field his cabinet officers must do his will. He must place in each
member of his official family, and his chief executive subordinates,
implicit faith. The moment that he loses confidence in the intelligence,
ability, judgment, or loyalty of any one of them, he must have the
power to remove him without delay. To require him to file charges and
submit them to the consideration of the Senate might make impossible
that unity and co-ordination in executive administration essential to
effective action. 88
Reasonable jurists may disagree with Taft's pronouncements about
how the President may legally run his "official family," but having former
President Taft explain the reasons for recognizing executive authority
provides credibility that Justices who have not served in high-level
executive positions cannot easily match.
In addition to legitimacy, a national politician would bring to the
Court a unique skill set acquired through experience in high-level
legislative or executive positions. Today's Supreme Court interprets
statutes and reviews congressional findings without any member who has
experience voting on legislation or compiling a legislative record. It
decides cases involving the role of Congress and the President in times of
war without any member who has been in Congress or served as a
cabinet member. In his concurring opinion in Youngstown, Justice
Jackson invoked his own experience in the executive branch as a source
of authority. 8, Jackson, who served as Attorney General to President
i86. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Er parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
187. 272 U.S. at 132 (internal citation omitted).
188. Id. at 132-34.
189. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Franklin Roosevelt and took his seat on the Court in the months
preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, began his concurrence by stating:
"That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both
practical advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress
anyone who has served as legal adviser to a President in time of
transition and public anxiety."'" Jackson next acknowledged that his
approach to the issue of executive power derived from his own
experience rather than from the usual tools available to judges: "While
an interval of detached reflection may temper teachings of that
experience [i.e., as Attorney General], they probably are a more realistic
influence on my views than the conventional materials of judicial
decision which seem unduly to accentuate doctrine and legal fiction."' 9'
Jackson went on to assert that traditional methods of constitutional
analysis did not provide a reliable basis for resolving the practical issue of
executive power that the case presented. Invoking the "poverty of really
useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of
executive power as they actually present themselves," 92 he explained:
"Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had
they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost
as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for
Pharaoh." 93 As a result, "partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields
no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from
respected sources on each side of any question" and these quotations
"largely cancel each other" because "[a] Hamilton may be matched
against a Madison." 9 4 According to Jackson, court decisions also do not
provide a basis for resolving a new question of executive authority
"because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in
the most narrow way."I95 After setting out his own approach to questions
of executive power, the three-part rubric with the pivotal "zone of
twilight" between the legislative and executive branches,196 Jackson
assessed his handiwork: "I have heretofore, and do now, give to the
190. Id.
191. Id. Of course, Chief Justice Taft might have found it difficult to share Justice Jackson's
sentiment. Not only did Taft have the unique experience among Chief Justices of having been
President of the United States, he also had the unique experience among Presidents of having been a
career judge before entering executive politics. Taft was a superior court judge in Ohio before
becoming Solicitor General (at age thirty-two) and then served eight years on the newly created U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 34, at 342. President
William McKinley accelerated Taft's unconventional, yet already remarkable, career onto the national
stage by appointing him Civil Governor of the Philippines in I9ol. Id. at 343.
192. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 634-35, 635 n.
195. Id. at 635.
196. Id. at 635-38.
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enumerated powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be
reasonable, practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a
doctrinaire textualism."'
97
Jackson's approach was designed not only for the purpose of
resolving Youngstown, but also to provide a general framework for
resolving future questions of the scope of executive authority. Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Sotomayor all emphasized the
importance of Justice Jackson's three-part test at their confirmation
hearings,'98 and the Court has invoked the test in recent cases.'" But the
Supreme Court on which Jackson sat looked quite different from today's
Court, which lacks a single member with high-level executive or
legislative experience. Whether Jackson would have thought his
framework could be successfully deployed in the hands of Justices
lacking such experience is far from clear."
More generally, the respected politician of national standing brings
statesmanship to the Court. Many Supreme Court decisions have
political consequences. Former politicians are adept at predicting those
consequences and managing their fallout precisely because they
understand the operations of the other branches of government. They
can guide the Court to adhere to the intragovernmental norms that shape
our national political system and limit overreaching by any one branch.
They can soften the blows of unpopular decisions because they more
fully understand when and where offense is likely to be taken. Because
they have spoken the language of politics and of the public in general,
197. Id. at 640.
198. See Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, supra note 16o, at 97 ("[T]he best expression of how to
address [an issue of executive power] . .. in a particular situation was made by Justice Jackson in his
concurrence in the Youngstown seizure cases."): Alito Confirmation Hearings, supra note 161, at 323-
24 ("I think [Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown] provides a very useful framework,.. . [I]t
doesn't answer every question that comes up in this area, but it provides a very useful way of looking
at them."); Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 159, at 152 ("Now, there often arise issues
where there's a conflict between the Legislature and the Executive over an exercise of Executive
authority, asserted Executive authority. The framework for analyzing that is in the Youngstown Sheet
and Tube case, the famdus case coming out of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills.").
199. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) ("Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite
scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action."); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 638 (2oo6) ("The proper framework for assessing whether executive actions are authorized is
the three-part scheme used by Justice Jackson in his opinion in Youngstown.") (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part).
200. For example, as Attorney General, Jackson was assigned with advising "the [P]resident
whether he had the authority, without seeking the approval of Congress, to conclude an executive
agreement with Great Britain" that would transfer fifty "over-age destroyers" to the British, that were
"desperately needed to combat German submarines," with the U.S. given in exchange "naval and air
bases on British possessions in the western Hemisphere." THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICEs, supra note
34, at 408.
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they can ensure that the Court's messages are not lost or confused in
translation.20'
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have made a case for returning politicians with
distinguished national profiles to the Supreme Court. Although there are
different ways in which the pool of suitable candidates might be
compiled, based on a combination of historical practices and the relative
significance of public offices today, we think that at least the following
should qualify: former Presidents, Vice Presidents, Senators, Secretaries
of State, Attorneys General, and Governors of large states such as
California and New York.
Some may claim that the law has become so technical that, as a
practical matter, prior judicial experience is a necessary qualification for
membership on the Supreme Court. However, members of each branch
of government are closely involved with the technical aspects of the law.
The federal statutes judges interpret are drafted to a high degree of
technicality by legislators and their staff members. On a day-to-day basis,
agency heads and administrators propose new statutes and rules based
on complex considerations. Presidents consider the opinions of the
Supreme Court and the inferior courts and respond. Senators and
Congressmen review, in committee, the meaning and effect of judicial
decisions and propose responses, such as new legislation. Government
executives and legislators read legal memoranda on their proposed
courses of action as a part of their job description. In all facets and in
every branch, government activity is steeped in questions of legality. A
former Attorney General, aided by research from law clerks, could
readily master the legal technicalities needed to understand and decide
cases at the Supreme Court, even without prior judicial experience.
Nonetheless, with the exception of former Presidents and Vice
Presidents, who offer unique experience in government service and who
have served in the only positions requiring a national election,' we
201. See ToCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 171-72 ("[A]lthough ... [the Supreme Court's] constitution
is essentially judicial, its prerogatives are almost entirely political. Its sole object is to enforce the
execution of the laws .... The Supreme Court of the United States summons sovereigns to its
bar .... [O]ne is struck by the responsibility of the [Justices] whose decision is about to satisfy or to
disappoint so large a number of fellow citizens. The peace, prosperity, and very existence of the Union
are vested in the hands of [the Justices].").
2o2. In this respect, a useful comparison is to the French Constitutional Council. Under Article 56
of the Constitution of the French Republic, the Constitutional Council, which exercises judicial review,
consists of nine members with nonrenewable terms of nine years. In addition, former Presidents of
France are ex officio life-members of the Constitutional Council. 1958 CoNsT. 56.
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recommend that all nominees be, like all of the past and current Justices,
lawyers by training.
To support the nomination of candidates whose political views are
known to the public is not to endorse the role of the Supreme Court
Justice as a political representative of the President or of the legislative
branch of government. Likewise, looking to a nominee's political record
in elected or appointed office does not challenge the independence of the
judiciary. Indeed, history demonstrates that the decisions of the Justices
are difficult to predict, and that Justices often surprise and disappoint
their presidential patrons with their independence. When Tom C. Clark,
the man who served as President Truman's Attorney General
(traditionally both an ally and confidante of presidents), confounded his
old boss with a concurrence in Youngstown on a matter Clark himself
once advised Truman would not violate the Constitution, Truman
remarked that "Tom Clark was my biggest mistake [as President]. No
question about it.... He hasn't made one right decision that I can think
of."20 4 Truman also noted that "[p]acking the Supreme Court simply can't
be done ... I've tried it and it won't work.... Whenever you put a man
on the Supreme Court he ceases to be your friend. I'm sure of that."'
Similarly, when asked if he had made any mistakes while President,
Eisenhower replied, "Yes, two, and they are both sitting on the Supreme
Court."'2o6 He was referring to Earl Warren and William Brennan.' In
more recent times, Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter
have surprised their patrons and parties by going against the political
currents that brought them to the Court.20' Justices, including those who
were politicians, do not necessarily vote predictably.
Yet the question remains: Do today's politicians have the qualities
of statesmanship that would allow them to serve with distinction on the
Supreme Court? Many decry contemporary politics as excessively
partisan, with insufficient concern for values, principles, ideals, and
compromise. Harry S. Truman once observed that "a statesman is a
politician who's been dead for fifteen years."" The observation is apt.
The politicians of the past who joined the Court emerged from highly
203. Possible lawyer-politicians today include the following: Attorneys General Mukasey,
Ashcroft, Reno, Barr, and Meese; Senators Specter, Leahy, Hatch, Lieberman, and Clinton;
Secretaries Clinton and Baker; and Governors Crist, (Jeb) Bush, and Pataki.
204. ABRAHAM, supra note 67, at 193.
205. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 470 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark A. Peterson eds., 2005).
2o6. ROBERT J. McKEEVER, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: A POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
134 (997).
207. TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 112 (1999).
208. The public, however, would have little cause for surprise, having known so little about their
views in the first place.
209. WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE's POLITICAL DICTIONARY 557 (2008) (quoting President Harry S.
Truman, Speech to the Reciprocity Club (Apr. I I, 1958)).
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partisan contexts, and they were often partisans themselves. For
example, Hugo Black, long-since lionized as not only a great statesman
but also the champion of Bill of Rights incorporation, was one of the
most divisive Supreme Court appointees ever. The Hugo Black who left
the Court in 1971 as an elder statesman was derided as a KKK member
in the 1920S, as an extreme leftist in the 1930s, and in the 1940s, he was
dogged by allegations of corruption by a revered co-Justice, Robert H.
Jackson.1 0 Rather than idealize the politics of the past, we should look
instead for nominees who, like their predecessors, have served for
extended periods in political office of national importance. The
President, and the people, should have confidence that the objective
qualities that enabled politicians to serve in public offices, and the
experience they gained in those positions, will enrich the Supreme Court
and our Constitution.
As this Article goes to press, Justice Stevens has retired from the
Supreme Court and President Obama has nominated Elena Kagan to
replace him. Kagan, the current Solicitor General and a former Dean of
Harvard Law School, is obviously accomplished. Kagan has also never
been a judge."' If confirmed, Kagan will be the first non-judge to join the
Court since Rehnquist in 1972. She will be the fourth New Yorker on the
Court. Although Kagan has some experience in the executive branch, 21 2
she does not have the high-level public profile of past politicians who
went on to serve on the Supreme Court. Kagan will not, therefore, bring
to the Court the statesmanship we think it needs. Nonetheless, President
Obama's "short list" of candidates to replace Justice Stevens did include
two career politicians: Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, a
two-term Arizona governor and that state's former Attorney General,
and Governor Jennifer Granholm of Michigan, also a former State
Attorney General.213 We hope that in considering these candidates, the
White House was laying the groundwork for the future appointment of a
distinguished politician to the Supreme Court.
21o. BALL, supra note 103, at 145.
211. Consistent with a theme of this Article, Senator Jeff Sessions, the ranking Republican on the
Senate Judiciary Committee, has stated he finds Kagan's "lack of judicial experience and short time as
Solicitor General" to be "troubling." Posting of Brian Montopoli to Political Hotsheet,
http://www.cbsnews.com/83o1-503544_i62-20004582-503544.html (May 'o, 2010, 2:07 EST).
212. Besides her brief service as Solicitor General, Kagan served in the Clinton Administration as
Associate White House Counsel, Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, and Deputy
Director of the Domestic Policy Council. Joan Biskupic, Will Kagan Be as Open as She Wanted Others
to Be?; Court Nominee Gets Her Turn Before Senate on Monday, USA TODAY, June 24, 2oro, at IA.
213. James Oliphant & Christi Parsons, Obama Casts a Wide Net; His Search for a Supreme Court
Nominee Includes the Nontraditional, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 54, 2olo, at Al i.
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TABLE A. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES' PRIOR JUDICIAL SERVICE AND
NOTABLE PUBLIC OFFICES2 14
Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court





Samuel A. George W. 2oo6- U.S. Court of U.S. Attorney,
Alito, Jr. Bush Appeals, 3rd District of New
Circuit Jersey
John G. George W. 2005- U.S. Court of
Roberts, Jr. Bush Appeals, D.C.
Circuit
Stephen G. Clinton 1994- U.S. Court of Assistant Special





Ruth Bader Clinton 1993- U.S. Court of
Ginsburg Appeals, D.C.
Circuit
Clarence George Bush 199- U.S. Court of Chairman, U.S.
Thomas Appeals, D.C. Equal Employment
Circuit Opportunity
Commission
David H. George Bush 199o- Superior Court of Attorney General,





Anthony M. Reagan 1988- U.S. Court of
Kennedy Appeals, 9th
Circuit
214. This Table was compiled using the following sources: THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1995 (Clare Cushman ed., 1995); WILLIAM D. BADER & Roy M.
MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED EIGHT JUSTICEs (2004); Federal Judicial Center, Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2413&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na
(last visited June 24, 2oio); Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of
the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited June 24, 2~oo); and
Supreme Court Historical Society, Timeline of the Justices, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/
history/supremecourthistory historysimeline.htm (last visited June 24, 2010).
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Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
Antonin Scalia Reagan 1986- U.S. Court of
Appeals, D.C.
Circuit
Sandra Day Reagan 1981- Maricopa County Arizona State
O'Connor 2oo6 Superior Court; Senate (Majority
Arizona Court of Leader)
Appeals
John Paul Ford 1975- U.S. Court of
Stevens 2010 Appeals, 7th
Circuit




Lewis F. Nixon 1972-
Powell, Jr. 1981
Harry Nixon 1970- U.S. Court of
Blackmun 1994 Appeals, 8th
Circuit
Warren E. Nixon 1969- U.S. Court of Assistant Attorney
Burger 1986 Appeals, D.C. General of the
Circuit United States,




Thurgood L. Johnson 1967- U.S. Court of U.S. Solicitor
Marshall 1991 Appeals, 2nd General
Circuit
Abe Fortas L. Johnson 1965-
1969
Arthur Kennedy 1962- Secretary of Labor
Goldberg 1965
Byron White Kennedy 1962- Deputy Attorney
1993 - General of the
United States





Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
Charles E. Eisenhower 1957- U.S. District





William J. Eisenhower 1956- New Jersey






John Marshall Eisenhower 1955- U.S. Court of Special Assistant
Harlan II 1971 Appeals, 2nd Attorney General
Circuit for New York




Sherman Truman 1949- U.S. Court of U.S. Senator
Minton 1956 Appeals, 7th
Circuit
Tom C. Clark Truman 1949- Attorney General
1967 - of the United
States
Fred M. Truman 1946- U.S. Court of U.S.
Vinson 1953 Appeals, D.C. Representative;
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Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court





Wiley B. F. Roosevelt 1943- U.S. Court of
Rutledge 1949 Appeals, D.C.
Circuit
Robert H. F. Roosevelt 1941- U.S. Solicitor
Jackson 1954 General; Attorney
General of the
United States
James F. F. Roosevelt 1941- U.S.
Byrnes 1942 - Representative;
U.S. Senator
Frank Murphy F. Roosevelt 1940- Recorder's Court Chief Assistant









William 0. F. Roosevelt 1939- Chairman,
Douglas 1975 Securities and
Exchange
Commission
Felix F. Roosevelt 1939- Chairman, War
Frankfurter 1962 - Labor Policies
Board
Stanley F. F. Roosevelt 1938- U.S. Solicitor
Reed 1957 General
Hugo Black F. Roosevelt 1937- U.S. Senator
197'
Benjamin N. Hoover 1932- New York





Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court






Charles Evans Hoover 1930- U.S. Supreme Governor of New
Hughes 1941 Court (Associate York
Justice)
Harlan F. Coolidge 1925- Attorney General
Stone (Associate) 1946 of the United
F. Roosevelt States
(Chief)
Edward T. Harding 1923- U.S. District Special Assistant to
Sanford 1930 Court, Middle & the Attorney
Eastern Districts General of the




Pierce Butler Harding 1923-
1939
George Harding 1922- Utah Senate; U.S.
Sutherland 1938 - Representative;
U.S. Senator
William Harding 1921- Ohio Superior U.S. Solicitor
Howard Taft 1930 Court; U.S. Court General; Civil










1396 [Vol. 6 1: 1353
July 2010] RETURNING POLITICIANS TO THE SUPREME COURT
Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
James Clark Wilson 1914- Assistant Attorney
McReynolds 1941 _ 9eneral; Attorney
kGeneral of the
United States
Mahlon Pitney Taft £912- New Jersey U.S.
1922 Supreme Court Representative;
New Jersey State
Senate (President)
Joseph R. Taft 1911- Georgia Supreme Georgia
Lamar 1916 Court Legislature
Willis Van Taft 19I1- Wyoming Territorial
Devanter 1937 Territorial Legislature;
Supreme Court Assistant Attorney
General
Charles E. Taft 1910- Governor of New
Hughes 1916 York
Horace H. Taft 1910- Sixth Chancery







William H. T. Roosevelt 1906- District Attorney








William R. T. Roosevelt 1903- Court of Secretary of State;
Day 1922 Common Pleas, Delegate, Paris





Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
Oliver T. Roosevelt 1902- Supreme Court of
Wendell 1932 Massachusetts
Holmes, Jr.
Joseph McKinley 1898- U.S. Court of District Attorney
McKenna 1925 Appeals, 9th for Solano County;




Rufus W. Cleveland 1896- New York
Peckham 1909 Supreme Court;
New York Court
of Appeals
Edward D. Cleveland 1894- Louisiana Louisiana State
White (Associate) 1921 Supreme Court Senate; U.S.
Taft Senator
(Chief)
Howell E. B. Harrison 1893- U.S. Court of Tennessee House
Jackson 1895 Appeals, Sixth of Representatives;
Circuit U.S. Senator
George Shiras, B. Harrison 1892-
Jr. 1903
Henry B. B. Harrison 1891- Circuit Court,
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Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
Melville Fuller Cleveland 1888- Illinois House of
1910 Representatives
Lucius Q.C. Cleveland 1888- Georgia





Samuel Arthur 1882- U.S. District




Horace Gray Arthur 1882- Supreme Court of
IL02_____._ 902 Massachusetts
Stanley Garfield 1881- Superior Court of Ohio Senate; U.S.






William B. Hayes 1881- U.S. Court of Ohio State House
Woods 1887 Appeals, 5th of Representative
Circuit
John Marshall Hayes 1877- County Court Attorney General
Harlan 1911 of Kentucky
Morrison Grant 1874- President, Ohio
Waite 1888 - Constitutional
Convention
Ward Hunt Grant 1873- New York Court New York
1882 of Appeals Assembly
Joseph P. Grant 1870-
Bradley 1892
William Grant 1870- Pennsylvania Reading City




Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
Salmon P. Lincoln 1864- U.S. Senator;
Chase 1873 Governor of Ohio;
Secretary of the
Treasury;
Stephen J. Lincoln 1863- California California State
Field 1897 Supreme Court Legislature
David Davis Lincoln 1862- Illinois Circuit Illinois State
1877 Court Legislature; Illinois
Constitutional
Convention
Samuel F. Lincoln 1862-
Miller 1890
Noah H. Lincoln 1862- Ohio Legislature;
Swayne 1881 - United States
Attorney for Ohio
Nathan Buchanan 1858- Maine Legislature:







John A. Pierce 1853- Alabama State
Campbell 186- Legislature
Benjamin R. Fillmore 1851- Massachusetts State
Curtis 1857 Legislature
Robert C. Polk 1846- District Court,
Grier 1870 Allegheny
County, PA
Levi Polk 1845- New Hampshire Governor of New








July 2010] RETURNING POLITICIANS TO THE SUPREME COURT
Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
Samuel Tyler 1845- Sixth Circuit of New York State
Nelson 1872 New York; New Constitutional
York Supreme Convention
Court
Peter V. Van Buren 1842- U.S. District Virginia State





John Van Buren 1838- Alabama State
McKinley 1852 Legislature; U.S.
Senator; U.S.
Representative
John Catron Jackson 1837- Tennessee
1865 Supreme Court of
Errors and
Appeals
Philip P. Jackson 1836- General Court Virginia House of
Barbour i841 for the Eastern Delegates; U.S.
District of Representative;
Virginia; U.S. Speaker of the
















Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
James M. Jackson 1835- Savannah Court Georgia State
Wayne 1867 of Common Legislature; Mayor
Pleas; Superior of Savannah; U.S.
Court of Georgia Representative
Henry Jackson 1830- U.S.
Baldwin 1844 Representative






Robert John Quincy 1826- Kentucky Court Kentucky House of
Trimble Adams 1828 of Appeals; Representatives;
U.S. District U.S. District
Court, Kentucky Attorney
Smith Monroe 1823- New York New York State












Gabriel Madison 1811- General Court of Maryland State






Thomas Todd Jefferson 1807- Kentucky Court Clerk, Kentucky
1826 of Appeals Statehood
I____Convention
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Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
William Jefferson 1804- Court of South Carolina
Johnson 1834 Common Pleas House of
Representatives
John Marshall John Adams 18oi- U.S.
1835 - Representative;
Secretary of State;
Alfred Moore John Adams 18oo- North Carolina North Carolina
1804 Superior Court State Legislature;
Attorney General
of North Carolina
Bushrod John Adams 1799- Virginia House of
Washington 1829 Delegates; Virginia
Ratification
Convention
Oliver Washington 1796- Superior Court of Connecticut






Samuel Chase Washington 1796- Baltimore Maryland General
1811 Criminal Court; Assembly;
General Court of Delegate to First &
Maryland Second Continental
Congresses.
John Rutledge Washington 1795 U.S. Supreme South Carolina










Name of Nominated Years Prior Judicial Notable Public
Justice By on Service Offices
Court
William Washington 1793- Provincial Congress











Thomas Washington 1792- General Court of Delegate to First &







James Iredell Washington 1790- Superior Court of Attorney General






John Rutledge Washington 1790- South Carolina
1791 Commons House of
Assembly;
Attorney General





John Blair, Jr. Washington 1790- First Virginia Virginia House of
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William Washington 179o- Probate Judge Massachusetts



















of Paris & Jay
Treaty
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